

d e m i n o r

National Bank of Belgium

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
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The information and explanation provided in this presentation cannot be considered as a legal opinion or as an investment recommendation. The only purpose of this presentation is to explain Deminor's opinion on the situation of the minority shareholders of the National Bank of Belgium (NBB). This information and explanation cannot be considered as a comprehensive analysis of the situation of the NBB's minority shareholders. This information and explanation cannot be considered as a recommendation to buy, sell or hold shares or other financial instruments issued by the NBB or related to such shares or financial instruments. Deminor can therefore not be held liable for any loss, damage or, in general, any consequence that would result from the use of this information and explanation.

Financial analysis – Update


State share vs net profit of the NBB



- The annual net profit of the NBB has steadily increased over the last six years, but the State has not been able to benefit from this trend. Its annual remuneration as public authority has strongly decreased.

Financial analysis – Update


State share vs Transfer to NBB's shareholders' equity



- Since the dividend is linked to inflation, the NBB continues to transfer an important part of its annual profits to its reserves. The pay-out ratio remains very low.

Financial analysis – Update


Evolution of the NBB's shareholder equity



- As a result, shareholders' equity has continued to rise (10.3% annual compound increase over a period of 26 years). It currently amounts to approximately 2.8 billion Euro (note : not including unrealised capital gains or realised capital gains on gold and foreign currency). These reserves belong to all shareholders.

Financial analysis – Update

Transfer to reserves – Comparison with other NCBs




- The Luxembourg central bank (which is still very young) is the only national central bank within the EMU that transfers more profits to its reserves than the NBB
- The average amount of profits transferred by the NBB to its reserve (61%) is more than **twice** the average amount for all NCBs of the EMU (29%)!

Financial analysis – Update

Evolution of shareholders' equity value per NBB share

Evolution of stock price vs book value of shareholders' funds after distribution of profits
(including provision for contingencies)


(remark : does not take into account the unrealised gains and the realised gains on gold and foreign currencies)



- The discount between the stock price and the book value of shareholder equity continues to rise. The stock price is relatively stable over the last three years (note : based on average price of last three months of the year to exclude volatile movements).

Financial analysis – Update

Share price NBB vs Share price Bank of Greece



- The stock market price of the Greek central bank, which is also listed, has increased much more and has been much more volatile. Who's talking about speculation ?

Annual General Meeting – 26 March 2007

- Deminor has submitted a list of questions
 - includes questions on the gold assets of the NBB following the Court's decision of 9 March 2007
- Deminor, along with four other shareholders, has asked to add items to the agenda of the meeting:
 - dividend policy
 - remuneration policy for the members of the Executive committee
- Deminor and the four other shareholders also filed proposals to amend the articles of association of the NBB in order to improve its corporate governance

Annual General Meeting – 26 March 2007

- The NBB is not in line with several fundamental corporate governance principles and refuses to comply with the Lippens Code
- Proposal to amend the Articles of Associations on key corporate governance issues such as :
 - The introduction of independence criteria for members of the « *conseil de régence* » and of the « *collège des censeurs* »
 - Obligation for members of the executive committee to abstain on decisions relating to their remuneration and their discharge
 - Introduction of a procedure regarding conflicts of interest
 - Lowering of the threshold to request a shareholders' meeting to 5% of the capital
 - Reintroduce special majority requirements for amendments to the Articles of Association in order to protect private shareholders from the influence of the State (protection abolished in 1993)